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FRM Part I · FRM Exam Part I

Central Clearing: formula sheet

Full chapter guide

Key formulas

Exposure of one trade
Exposure = max(V, 0)
V is the market value to you. Only a positive value is at risk if the counterparty defaults.
Exposure without netting
Exposure = Σ max(Vi, 0)
Each trade is treated separately. Negative trades give no offset.
Exposure with close-out netting
Exposure = max(Σ Vi, 0)
Applies to trades in one legally enforceable netting set.
Exposure after collateral
Uncollateralised exposure = max(Net value − Collateral held, 0)
With a threshold H, collateral called is roughly max(Net value − H, 0), subject to the MTA.
Netting benefit
Netting benefit = Exposure without netting − Exposure with netting
Always zero or positive. It is zero when all trades have the same sign.
Net-to-gross ratio (NGR)
NGR = Net exposure ÷ Gross exposure
Lower NGR means more benefit from netting. Gross exposure is the sum of positive values.
Novation result
A–B trade → A–CCP trade + CCP–B trade
The original contract is extinguished. The CCP is the counterparty to both sides.
CCP net position
Σ long positions − Σ short positions = 0 (when all members perform)
The CCP is matched, so it has no net market exposure.
Number of bilateral links
n(n − 1) ÷ 2 bilateral relationships vs n links to a CCP
Shows how a CCP simplifies the web. For 10 firms: 45 vs 10.
Multilateral net exposure
Net exposure to CCP = Σ (positions across all trades with all counterparties)
Gains and losses offset across counterparties, which bilateral netting cannot do.
Default waterfall order
Defaulter's margin → defaulter's default fund contribution → CCP capital → surviving members' default fund contributions
Exact order and any CCP capital layers vary by CCP rules. Learn the logic: defaulter pays first.
Daily variation margin
VM = Current mark-to-market value − Previous mark-to-market value (paid by the party that lost)
For a long futures position: VM received = (F_t − F_t-1) × contract size × number of contracts. A negative result means you pay.
Margin period of risk scaling
IM ≈ z × σ_daily × √(MPOR in days) × Position value
A common simple approximation under normal returns with zero mean. z is 2.33 for 99% one-tailed and 1.645 for 95%. Real CCP models are more complex, but this appears in questions.
Default waterfall order
Defaulter's IM → Defaulter's default fund contribution → CCP's own capital → Surviving members' default fund contributions → further CCP tools (e.g., assessments)
Check the order given in the question. The defaulter's own resources always come first.
Loss to be mutualised
Loss after defaulter resources = Close-out loss − Defaulter's IM − Defaulter's default fund contribution
If the result is zero or negative, no one else is touched.
Cover standard
Cover 1: fund covers default of largest member. Cover 2: fund covers default of the two largest members.
Sizing is done under extreme but plausible scenarios.
Margin and loss-absorption order
Defaulter's initial margin → defaulter's default fund contribution → CCP's own capital (skin in the game) → surviving members' default fund contributions
Called the default waterfall. Exact layers vary by CCP, but the defaulter pays first and survivors' mutualized funds come later.
Variation margin
VM = change in mark-to-market value of the position, paid daily
Settles current exposure. It does not cover future moves, which initial margin covers.
Net exposure
Net exposure = max(Σ positive and negative values, 0)
Netting across contracts with the same party lowers exposure. Under multilateral CCP netting, a member faces one net position.
Reform pillars
Clear standardized OTC + trade on platforms + report to repositories + margin uncleared + higher capital
The core G20 reform list. Know all five.

Quick revision

  • OTC trades are bilateral and customised, so each party bears the other's default risk.
  • Novation replaces the original contract with two contracts, each facing the CCP.
  • A CCP becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.
  • Multilateral netting cuts total exposures compared with bilateral netting.
  • Initial margin covers potential future losses if a member defaults, and is set to a high confidence level over a close-out period.
  • Variation margin settles daily mark-to-market changes and is usually paid in cash.
  • The default fund is mutualised: members share losses beyond the defaulter's own resources.
  • The defaulter pays first, then the CCP's own capital, then surviving members' contributions.
  • Central clearing concentrates risk, so a CCP failure would be systemic.
  • Margin can be procyclical: it rises in stress and drains liquidity.
  • Mutualisation can create moral hazard if members do not bear the cost of their own risk.
  • Post-crisis reform pushed standardised OTC derivatives to CCPs and added margin rules for non-cleared trades.

Common mistakes

  • Treating a negative trade value as an exposure. Fix: Use max(V, 0) for each trade. A negative value is zero exposure.
  • Netting trades with different counterparties. Fix: Net only within a single legal netting agreement with one counterparty.
  • Saying a CCP eliminates counterparty risk. Fix: Say it replaces many exposures with one exposure to the CCP, managed with margin and a default fund. Risk is concentrated.
  • Thinking novation keeps the original contract alive. Fix: The original contract is extinguished and replaced by two new contracts with the CCP.
  • Treating variation margin as a buffer that is returned. Fix: VM is a settlement of realised gains and losses. IM is the buffer held against future loss and returned when positions close.
  • Using surviving members' default fund contributions before the defaulter's own resources. Fix: Always start with the defaulter's IM and its own default fund contribution. Others' funds come after the CCP's own capital in a standard waterfall.
  • Saying central clearing eliminates counterparty risk. Fix: It transfers and concentrates risk in the CCP, and cuts it through netting and margin.
  • Confusing procyclicality with moral hazard. Fix: Procyclicality is margin rising in stress. Moral hazard is weaker risk discipline because losses are shared or rescued.

Exam tips

  • Always check whose perspective the values are quoted from before computing exposure.
  • Look for the words 'enforceable' or 'legal opinion'. If netting is doubtful, compute exposure gross.
  • Know the CSA terms: threshold, MTA, haircut, eligible collateral and margin period of risk. Questions often test them by definition.
  • Be ready to compare bilateral and central clearing: flexibility and tailored terms versus standardisation, novation and mutualised default resources.
  • Expect conceptual MCQs: pick the option that says the CCP becomes buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer.
  • Reject any option claiming a CCP eliminates credit risk or removes the need for margin.
  • In netting questions, compute net and gross exposure, then compare. Watch the sign of each position.
  • Link standardization to benefits: it allows fungibility, valuation and close-out. Customized trades usually stay bilateral.