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CFA Level I · CFA Level I Exam · Investors and Other Stakeholders

Executives whose bonuses depend entirely on short-term earnings cut research spending to meet quarterly targets, harming long-term value. This outcome is most likely a result of:

The outcome most likely results from compensation misaligned with long-term shareholder interests. Bonuses tied to short-term earnings encourage managers to cut research spending to hit targets, sacrificing long-term value, which is a principal-agent problem fixed by long-term incentives.

  1. Acompensation misaligned with long-term shareholder interestsCorrect
  2. Bshareholders being given excessive voting rights
  3. Ccreditors imposing restrictive covenants

Explanation

Pay tied only to short-term earnings gives managers incentive to boost near-term results at the expense of long-term value. This is an agency problem addressed by aligning compensation with long-term performance. Voting rights and covenants are unrelated to the described behavior.

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