Skip to content

CMA Final · Strategic Cost Management · Game Theory

In a zero-sum game, payoffs to A are: A1 = 6 and 2; A2 = 3 and 5 (columns B1 and B2). A publicly commits to always playing A1, and B, knowing this, chooses its best response. What is A's payoff?

A's payoff is 2. Once B knows A will play A1, B minimises A's gain by choosing B2, which pays 2 rather than 6. This is below the mixed-strategy game value of 4, showing predictability is costly.

  1. A2Correct
  2. B3
  3. C4
  4. D6

Explanation

If A plays A1, B (minimiser) chooses between 6 (B1) and 2 (B2) and picks B2, so A gets 2. The game value with optimal mixing is 4, so committing to a pure strategy loses 2 relative to the optimum. The figure 6 ignores that B responds.

Did you get it right without looking?

One question tells you little. A timed set on Game Theory shows your real accuracy, how long you take and where you lose marks.

More Game Theory questions