CMA Foundation · Fundamentals of Business Economics and Management · Stewardship Theory and Agency Theory of Management
Which view of human behaviour about managers is the central assumption of stewardship theory?
Stewardship theory assumes managers are collectivist and pro-organisational. They gain satisfaction from achieving organisational goals and act as trustworthy stewards of owners' resources, unlike agency theory, which treats managers as self-interested and opportunistic individuals needing close monitoring and incentive alignment.
- AManagers are opportunistic and always act to maximise their own wealth
- BManagers are collectivist and pro-organisational, finding satisfaction in achieving organisational goalsCorrect
- CManagers are motivated only by monetary incentives linked to share price
- DManagers need constant external monitoring to prevent shirking
Explanation
Stewardship theory assumes managers are trustworthy stewards whose interests align with those of the organisation and its owners. They derive satisfaction from organisational success. The opportunistic, monitoring-heavy view in the other options belongs to agency theory.
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