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CFA Level I · CFA Level I Exam · Investors and Other Stakeholders

A board considers compensation for a CEO whose firm has significant debt. Which design is most likely to reduce both the shareholder-manager conflict and the shareholder-creditor conflict?

The best design is long-term compensation mixing equity and debt-like deferred pay with clawback. It aligns the manager with both shareholders and creditors and discourages short-termism and excessive risk. Revenue-based bonuses or immediately vesting options reward growth or risk regardless of value, worsening conflicts.

  1. ABonuses based entirely on annual revenue growth
  2. BStock options as the dominant pay component, vesting immediately
  3. CLong-term pay with a mix of equity and debt-like deferred compensation, subject to clawbackCorrect

Explanation

Deferred pay combining equity and debt-like elements aligns the manager with both shareholders and creditors, discouraging excessive risk, and long horizons with clawbacks limit short-termism. Revenue bonuses reward growth regardless of value, and option-heavy immediate vesting encourages risk-taking that harms creditors.

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